Cephalove

To get things started, here’s a video of an octopus with a Mr. Potato Head Toy (and other things):

You’ll see why this is relevant in a minute. Now on to the post!

“Enrichment” is a psychological term that’s been thrown around a lot. It’s become a buzzword in publications about education, perhaps rightly so given its huge impact on the field of developmental psychology. It has been the subject of intense study in psychology, and continues to be the subject of study. But what exactly is it that we are referring to when we use the term “enrichment”?

Before I get to that, let’s take a step back and consider how brains work. Brains, in the sense that I am talking about, are simply big networks of neurons (there are other types of cells, but we can ignore them for now.) These neurons get sensory input from the body, talk amongst themselves, and send out signals that cause the organism to behave in a certain way. This is, in a nutshell, what brains do – they generate behavior. Importantly, though, they don’t just generate any behavior at a given time; they generate the appropriate behavioral response to the immediate situation. Even more impressively, in some animals, they generate the response that will lead to a positive outcome in some hypothetical future situation (for example, when birds hide food to recover later.) Thus, brains work because they can process incoming sensory information into relevant and adaptive behaviors. Neurons can do this because they are connected to each other in complex but well-controlled and highly-specific ways. Much in the way that an electrical device will only operate if all of its components are connected correctly, brains will only work if all of their neurons (or at least most of them) are “wired” together into functional circuits.

It may come as no surprise, then, that brains only wired the way they are because of the sensory input they receive. During brain development (and, to a lesser extent, throughout life,) neurons require sensory input and behavioral output to form proper connections as well as get rid of improper connections. At the cellular level, this phenomenon is called activity-dependent or experience-dependent plasticity. One can think of it this way: connections between neurons (called synapses) that are used a lot and produce functional behaviors get stronger; that is, they become more efficient and transmit larger signals from neuron to neuron. Synapses that are not used, or that don’t contribute or contribute negatively to the function of a certain circuit become weaker; that is, they become smaller and less efficient, and may even disappear altogether.

This can be demonstrated directly by looking at neurons that process incoming visual information from the eyes. Suppose we were to raise one group of animals (lets say, ferrets) completely in the dark, and another, otherwise identical group of animals normally. Then, we kill both groups of animals and look at the neurons in their visual system (for example, in visual cortex.) The group that was raised under normal light will have, by definition, normal connections between the neurons in the visual system – specifically, these neurons will form functional circuits that allow animals to sense and respond to their environment. In the animals that were reared in the dark (called, sensibly, “dark-reared” animals,) we’ll see a host of abnormalities – cells will have the wrong shapes, end up in the wrong places, and have the wrong connections. Besides this, we could demonstrate some deficiencies in visual perception in the dark-reared animals. Taken together, these results, which have been replicated in a variety of vertebrates, strongly support the idea that sensory systems need input during development in order to develop properly.

It’s a small logical step to tentatively extend the principal of experience-dependent plasticity to brain functions that are more complex than immediate sensory analysis. In the mammalian cortex (which is involved in such complex behaviors as navigation, auditory and visual perception, social behavior, speech, thought, and so forth,) normal development is dependent on the experience of the animal in question during development. The input that these brain areas deal with is almost unthinkably complex. Their function often involves the monitoring the interaction of large parts of the organism with the environment over an extended period of time. For example, cortical areas involved in directing complex hand movements (say, playing a musical instrument) receive their input in the context of a feedback loop that involves planning a movement, executing it, and then determining whether the movement was successful and, if it was not, how it needs to be changed in order to be successful the next time. More abstract cognitive processes become even more complicated, as the brain areas responsible for these have to take into account such complex “stimuli” as the animals current and previous emotional states, inferred emotional states in other animals, the value of various hypothetical outcomes to the organism, prior cognitive states the animal has had, and so forth.

Here’s where the idea of environmental enrichment comes into the picture. The logic goes like this: because neural development is facilitated by the nervous system’s interaction with the environment, and because the more integrative areas of the brain (like the cortex) interact with the environment in very complex ways, normal brain development requires interaction with a very complex environment. If this theory is true, animals raised in very restricted environments (we might call them “environmentally impoverished”) should show maladaptive or sub-normal behavior as adults. In fact, this prediction has been borne out in many studies, which find that (among other things) environmentally impoverished animals (and, although it has been less directly demonstrated, people) have altered learning abilities, exploratory behavior, cognition, stress reactivity, and social behavior.

A corollary of this theory is the idea that nervous systems which have evolved to deal with the environment in very complex ways function abnormally when they do not have complex environments to deal with, much like the way that muscles atrophy if they are not used. Part of successfully engaging a complex environment is continually interacting with and exploring it – indeed, many animals have evolved a propensity to explore and manipulate their environment. Thus, animals with complex behavioral repertoires require complex environments to interact with in order to maintain normal brain function. This theory predicts that a lack of complexity in some animals’ (or people’s) environments should lead to aberrant behavior, and that such behavior can be corrected by providing an appropriately complex environment to those animals (or people.) This prediction is borne out in a variety of studies that show that, in captive adult animals, providing more complex environments leads to lower stress levels, less aggression, and fewer pathological and stereotyped behaviors.

Dr. James Wood’s article, “Environmental Enrichment in the Giant Pacific Octopus; Happy as a clam?” makes the case that aquariums should provide environmental enrichment for captive octopuses. I won’t follow his arguments exactly, but I will examine some of the same questions that he covers, and make reference to and critiques of his work as I find it relevant.

The big question is this: Should we provide environmental enrichment to captive cephalopods? Let me rephrase this: do the benefits of providing environmental enrichment to cephalopods justify the costs incurred by doing so?

First, let’s consider the possible benefits. Anderson and Wood point out several:

1. Captive animals should be kept healthy and allowed to behave normally. Behavioral health is as important to the longevity and quality of animal’s lives as is physiologic health. The real question here is whether cephalopods have complex enough behavior that they might show pathological behavior in response to captive conditions. Put in a more cognitive frame: are cephalopods smart enough to be hurt by captivity and, consequently, to benefit from enrichment?

Indeed, it is hard to tell whether cephalopods could benefit from enrichment. To the question of how we can tell if giant pacific octopuses could benefit from enrichment, Anderson and Wood succinctly conclude: “Simply put, we cannot.” Because cephalopods have evolved under predation from fishes, they reason, they spend most of the time during which they are not hunting hiding in their dens. It’s hard to tell if this is “good” for the octopus (after all, it seems like it would be nice not to have the daily stress of fleeing from predators and risking death during hunting) or bad (because, if cephalopods can become bored, this behavior certainly seems like it would be really boring.) In addition, little is know about how behavioral pathology might look in cephalopods, because we know so little about their behavior in general.

In sum, cephalopods may or may not benefit from enrichment. Given how complex their behavior appears to be, and the likelihood that at least some cephalopods possess cognitive capacities to rival at least some vertebrates, it seems like there’s a reasonably good chance that they could. This isn’t a convincing case in itself – it really depends on the costs of providing enrichment to cephalopods. If the costs are low, this might be enough of a reason to do it; with increasing costs, it becomes an increasingly bad bet.

2. Animal enclosures should meet the expectations of the public. Showing the public what they want to see – which is, it seems, natural-looking enclosures that animals can interact with) will lead to financial success and public support for zoos and aquariums. Researchers, institutions, and the enterprise of biological science in general stand to benefit from the increased public support that comes with presenting a public-pleasing image of animal husbandry in research. Also, if the public sees naturally-behaving animals instead of pathologically-behaving animals, they learn more about the animal’s behavior. A primary function of zoos and aquariums is to educate the public about animals, and so the potential to improve on this education is an important possible result of providing enrichment to cephalopods.

This is an interesting idea to me. Octopuses are popular aquarium animals, but not very popular research animals. The public face of animal research is usually mammalian, including rats, mice, rabbits, and primates. It’s doubtful to me that researchers would benefit from an improved public image if all octopuses used in research were given lots of enrichment. In zoos and aquariums, though, this seems like a valid concern. Indeed, it could offset the monetary costs of providing enrichment for these institutions, which allows less tangible benefits (like the possibility of relieving the suffering of bored octopodes) to be given more weight in deciding whether or not to provide enrichment for captive cephalopods.

3. Finally, zoos and aquariums often care for animals with the goal of eventually releasing them into the wild. Animals whose behavior is dependent on learning need to practice skills that will allow them to succeed, such as hunting, defending from predators and rivals, and maintaining good relationships with other individuals of their species. The Seattle aquarium, for example, does this with their giant pacific octopuses. They catch individuals, hold and display them for a few years, and then release them into the wild so that they have a chance to breed.

It’s doubtful to me that enrichment benefits cephalopods in this way. I can’t say that it’s impossible, but it seems unlikely. While cephalopods are able learners, the basics of cephalopod behavior – feeding, escape, and mating – appear to be largely innate. For example, octopuses learn things in order to adapt to the specific micro-environments they end up in. The characteristics of these environments are impossible for aquariums to predict, and so they cannot be simulated. Feeding a cephalopod common local prey species so that it learns how to eat those species efficiently might help it succeed if it is released, but besides this one example there seems to be relatively little to do in the way of “preparing” a cephalopod for release.

Before I hash out some of the costs of providing enrichment to captive cephalopods, let’s consider what providing such enrichment entail. Anderson and Wood suggest several ideas for giant pacific octopuses, most of which could work with other species of cephalopods. The one that sticks out to me is feeding the animals a variety of live prey. This would provide them with a good deal of activity, a variety of problems to solve (how to catch and eat different species of prey,) and is very entertaining for the public to watch. Some cephalopods (cuttlefish come to mind – I’ve read cuttlefish keepers complaints about this) will only reliably eat live food, anyways.

The authors also suggest that the octopuses be given objects to explore, which can be smeared with fish drippings or have food hidden in them to attract the octopus and encourage exploration. In my favorite quote of the paper, they recount a particular use of this technique:

Wood and Wood… hid food in a play ship – the octopus had to “sink” the ship to get the proffered food. Such a demonstration with a large octopus… would interest the paying customers of a public aquarium by invoking a “sea monster” image.”

The future of cephalopod husbandry.

They also suggest the use of “training” to provide enrichment to octopuses (I put “training” in scare quotes, because some of their specific suggestions, such as smearing fish-smelling fluid on parts of the tank, don’t necessarily involve learning.) This seems like a moot point to me. There are two ways in which you can train a cephalopod – by rewarding it with food, or by punishing it with electric shocks (or some other unpleasant stimulus.) In the first case, you might as well simply give the animal the food, the capture of which seems like it would provide most of the activity inherent in training. In the latter case, well, who’s going to argue that training an animal by electric shock improves its quality of life or reduces its suffering (assuming that the training isn’t absolutely necessary, such as teaching it not to attack people or run into traffic, etc.)?

What would be the costs of providing this sort of enrichment to cephalopods? In my estimation, they would be small. Here’s my reasoning:

It should be relatively easy for aquariums, especially those near coasts, to obtain live prey to feed to cephalopods. By advertising the feeding times (as is done with the animals like sharks, dolphins, and sea lions) aquariums could turn this into a way to entertain visitors and draw more business. The increased popularity of octopus exhibits would likely make up for the extra cost of providing more live food. One of the complaints I hear about the giant pacific octopus exhibit at the Niagara Falls Aquarium is that it just sits there all the time. In the interest of furthering public interest in cephalopods, I make sure to write “Please publicize octopus feeding times!” in their guestbook each time I visit. I’m sure that if they did this, their visitors would be more interested in the octopus and happier with the aquarium overall.

Similar reasoning applies to constructing interesting enclosures that encourage cephalopods to explore. The public likes to see animals doing things, and the increased public interest will more than make up for the expenses of outfitting an octopus tank (which can be as cheap as a few plastic toys) These forms of enrichment are probably very cost effective, at least for public aquariums, even if they have only a small chance of benefit the captive animals.

When we consider animals used for research, the costs become larger. Giving animals a less monotonous environment may exaggerate inter-individual variation. It is usually argued that enrichment produces consistently healthy experimental animals, and so reduces variation in experimental results. The research that is used to make this argument in the case of mammals, however, has not been replicated in cephalopods. Without such evidence, it’s hard to say what effect different kinds of enrichment would have on behavioral experiments with octopuses. Such evidence would be rather expensive and time-consuming to obtain, and providing enriched environments to experimental cephalopods on the assumption that it would improve results could be, if that assumption were wrong, very costly as well. If behavioral research on cephalopods becomes more popular, this will become a more urgent question, and somebody will have to take on the task and expense of answering it.

Generally, providing enrichment for captive cephalopods seems worth it. Given the (even relatively slight) chance that they could benefit from basic environmental enrichment and the small cost of such enrichment, there’s no reason not to do it. The deal only becomes sweeter when you take into account the benefits to aquarium popularity and public education. Even if the cephalopods don’t benefit from it, it can hardly hurt.

Thanks for reading!

Anderson, R., & Wood, J. (2001). Enrichment for Giant Pacific Octopuses: Happy as a Clam? Journal of Applied Animal Welfare Science, 4 (2), 157-168 DOI: 10.1207/S15327604JAWS0402_10

van Praag H, Kempermann G, & Gage FH (2000). Neural consequences of environmental enrichment. Nature reviews. Neuroscience, 1 (3), 191-8 PMID: 11257907

Here at the Southern Fried Science Network, all of us bloggers have been charged to post articles dealing with ocean-related pseudoscience as part of SFSN’s first “Ocean of Pseudoscience Week.” Since I try to keep this blog firmly focused on cephalopods, I was at first antsy that I would not find anything to write about. However, the (sometimes distressingly) wide pool of information that is the internet has not disappointed me.

You’ve all heard about Paul the Octopus by now. A Google search for “Paul the Octopus” (the exact phrase) turns up 5.5 million results. A blossoming cephalopod enthusiast who is curious about Paul can pick from literally millions of sources of information to hear about this phenomenon, and if she’s smart, will try to pick one that seems credible. Like, say, a CNN news report. She would find some informative and entertaining quips, and would mostly get the facts straight. That is, until she got to the point in the article where the CNN reporter asks an “expert” the critical question:

“Can an octopus really be psychic?”

After reading this section, if she had any sort of head on her shoulders, our inquisitive internet reader would (hopefully) be aghast, and a bit miffed that a CNN report would be such a lousy source of information.

Before I go on, let me say that there are any number of highly qualified people who could of answered this question. There are several researchers who study cephalopod behavior and cognition who are generally pretty friendly, and besides that entire societies of researchers devoted to scientificially studying claims of the “supernatural”. CNN is supposed to be credible, right? They’re one of the big names in news, globally. But their reporter didn’t pick anybody who was an expert in the science and psychology behind “parapsychological” phenomena or an expert on cephalopods. Instead, he decided to interview Michelle Childerley (see her personal homepage), a self-proclaimed “Animal Communication Expert
Pet Psychic & Behaviour Specialist.” Her qualifications include thinking that she could talk to her pet dog as a child (who didn’t, though?), as is proclaimed on her “About” page:

Michelle felt since the age of seven that she was aware of a special connection with her dog Jason, her soul mate throughout her childhood. She always knew exactly what Jason was thinking and feeling and would enjoy endless conversations. After Jason was taken away at the age of twelve, Michelle shut down her intuitive awareness for many years to come.
It wasn’t until 2006 that Michelle became aware of her ability once again when the dog of a man selling the big issue suddenly spoke to her. In that moment a reconnection was established and Michelle then set out to bridge the gap between animal and human communication.

(As an aside: what is “the big issue”? I’d love to know.)

So what did Ms. Childerley have to say about Paul? You might have guessed what her take would be. From the CNN article:

Michelle Childerley, who describes herself as an animal communications expert, told CNN that all animals — as well as humans — possess a psychic ability, with telepathy the main way of communicating among many species. She says dogs can often sense what an owner wants before they vocalize it.
As for as Paul’s ability to predict a football result, Childerley claims the octopus is perfectly aware of what he is being asked. “He’s picking up on what everyone around him is thinking,” she said. “He knows there are two boxes which represent two sides, so he’s basically tuned in to the more positive team at the moment he makes his choice.”

Why care about this women and her claims about communications with animals? For one thing, she’s selling these claims to people as a sort of veterinary care, taking money both from misled pet owners and from legitimate practitioners (this is not to say she might not use some legitimate animal training procedures in some of her work, but she will also accept 30 pounds to do an “animal readings/consultations by an emailed or posted photograph”, which means that you send her some money and a picture of your pet, and she will tell you what’s wrong with your pet’s emotional/psychic life. Despite my small knowledge of the field of veterinary medicine, I am sure that this is not a legitimate veterinary care technique.) In addition, claims like hers serve to distract from and give a bad name to people who are trying to work on the sciences of animal communication and animal-human communication. It turns out that communicating with animals in a reproducible and useful way is much more difficult than being paid money to look at a digital image and coming up with a diagnosis and prognosis based on the feeling you get from the image. Pet psychics (especially those who bill themselves with sciencey-sounding titles like “Animal Communications Expert”) give a bad name to the scientists who are working hard to actually understand and explain animal communication and cognition.

The reporter might have redeemed the article if he’d presented any other opinions on the topic, or any indication that readers might want take this “expert’s” testimony with a grain of salt. Sadly, he didn’t. We’re left wondering whether he really took Ms. Childerley’s comments seriously, or if he’s just kind of bad at finding relevant people to interview.

To give credit and links where they are due, I first heard about this story at Boing Boing, where Maggie Koerth-Baker had the right reaction to it: a hearty facepalm.

Thanks for reading!

         I was recently pointed to this article on “octopus intelligence”.  I like the article (which features quotes from such cephalopod research all-stars as Roger Hanlon and Jennifer Mather,) although I am a bit let down by the brief, incomplete explanation that is given to the various “intellectual” abilities of the octopus such as “problem solving” and “play”.  Both of these behaviors are difficult to define precisely, and are often understood in vertebrates by analogy to human experience.  For example, one of the criteria that is used to define play in animals (as stated in Kuba et al. 2003, a study on play-like behavior in octopuses) is that it is “spontaneous and pleasurable (‘done for its own sake’)”.  This is one of the central features of play – that it appears to serve no other immediate purpose than to entertain or occupy the animal expressing the behavior.  I take some issue with the use of the term “play
 to describe octopus behavior, at the very least because the implications of play-like behavior in the octopus are not very well studied yet.  It’s much harder to determine the motivational significance of an activity in an octopus than it is in, say, a rat.  This is because we know the brain and behavior of the rat much more thoroughly than we know those of octopuses, and since they are structurally similar to ours we can relatively easily design valid measures of motivation in rats.  In contrast to the vast (though still incomplete) neurological and behavioral description of pleasurable and aversive states in the rat that we have generated, we have only a very crude measure of the possible hedonic characteristics of an activity in the octopus; that is, we can assume that the octopus will do “pleasurable” things and will avoid aversive things, but we have little more to go on when we are talking about the motivation of an octopus.  Because of this limitation, I think that it may be too early to say for sure what processes play-like behaviors in the octopus actually represent, and so the touting of play as evidence of the impressive mental powers of the octopus also seems premature.

         Whoa, now!  Before I go making assertions like this, I should look at the research, right?  Good call.  Let’s see what the vast scientific library that is the internet can teach us about the play-like behavior of octopuses.

         I’ll focus on Kuba et al. (2006), a recent study that was done to examine putative play behavior in O. vulgaris.  In this study, the authors exposed octopuses to stimuli made out of Lego blocks for half an hour at a time repeatedly over a period of 7 days and scored the octopuses reactions to the objects.  The authors’ scoring system is illustrated below (this if Figure 1 from the paper.)

         As you can see, level 3 (which the authors describe as “play-like”) and level 4 (which the authors call “play”) involve repeatedly manipulating non-food objects in complex, non-stereotyped ways for a significant amount of time.  Out of 14 (wild-caught) subjects, object manipulation that was scored at level 3 was observed in 9 subjects, and object manipulation that was scored at level 4 was observed in one subject.  There was no difference of age or hunger state in this behavior (young and old octopuses showed the same sorts of behavior, as did hungry and sated octopuses.)  Play-like behaviors tended to occur after several days of presentation of the stimulus, suggesting that this was not merely exploratory behavior, which appeared to decrease during the first few days of exposure (as the octopuses presumably got used to the presence of the stimuli in their tanks.)

         By this point, I tentatively buy the characterization of these behaviors as “play” – they don’t appear to serve any purpose for the octopus, who is clearly not simply confusing the objects with food.  They are exhibited after the octopus has presumably had ample time to learn that they do not represent a threat.  The behaviors do not appear to clearly belong to any other class of behavior (except perhaps tactile exploratory behavior.)  As I said before, however, using the existence of these behaviors to argue for the intelligence of the octopus seems premature to me.  For one, the significance of these behaviors in the wild is not well understood – they must confer some survival utility, but they do not appear to be disproportionately expressed in young, rapidly developing octopuses as they are in mammalian young, and so are unlikely to contribute to neurodevelopment in the same way that play in mammals (especially social mammals) is thought to.  We know that play in social mammals (like humans, some apes, and rats) serves a variety of functions in development – to establish dominance hierarchies, to develop skills for living within social organizations, to learn hunting and food-gathering behaviors, to help develop motor coordination, etc.  We have comparatively little sense of the importance of play in the life of an octopus, and so it is hard to know what play-like behavior means in the context of octopus cognition.

         Because we know that play is very important to the cognitive function of mammals I mentioned previously (more properly, we know that disrupting play behavior causes deficits in behaviors that depend on play to develop,) we can claim that play is part of a group of behaviors that make manifest the intelligence of these animals.  Without knowing what play-like behavior does for an octopus, it’s hard to say whether it implies an analogous intelligence in these animals.  It might be explained in many cases as a simple extension of exploratory behavior.  As a foraging predator, it makes sense that O. vulgaris would be served well by repeated, thorough explorations of the same object, which mobile and semi-mobile prey would presumably periodically be found on.  This behavior might be explained as part of a foraging strategy that is somewhat impervious to associative learning, and so violate the criteria that we use to classify a behavior as play all together.

         My discussion thus far has accepted the hypothesis that behavior classifiable as play occurs regularly in the octopus, and thus needs to be explained in terms of its adaptive utility to the animal.  Based on the previously summarized paper, however, clear play-like behavior in the octopus appears to be pretty rare.  On the 5th day of the experiment, when play-like behavior peaked, 444 interactions with the stimuli were observed.  Out of these, 13% qualified as level 2 (they involved manipulation beyond very basic exploration of the object with the arms,) 0.9% were scored as play-like, and a single observation (0.02% of the total observations) was scored as being definitively “play”.  I think this was a well-designed study, but the results don’t convince me that play (as defined by the authors) is terribly important in the lives of octopuses, and might just as well represent a rare, specific type of interac
tion that they have with unusual stimuli in a laboratory environment.

         I realize that I have been sort of hard on this study.  I don’t want to imply that octopuses are not remarkable animals that are capable of many things one wouldn’t expect from a mollusc.  I do think, however, that it pays to be very skeptical about the use of the terms “play” and “intelligence”.  Both of these are concepts that we understand primarily by analogy to our experience of them as humans.  We know that social play in vertebrates is indeed play (even the scientists among us) because we know what a play fight feels like, and understand intuitively how it differs from a real fight.  We can extend this to behaviors that we see in animals (with more or less accuracy, depending on the situation.)  We know what intelligence means (or we think we do) because we have expectations of how people should function, and we can draw analogies to other vertebrates who have the same sort of behavioral flexibility and environmental demands that we do.  One might dismiss this as unscientific, but we have pretty good evidence that the neural structures that are responsible for a variety of emotions and types of behaviors are conserved in some form across species (in mammals at least.)   Thus, we can be somewhat comfortable in our understanding of the role of play in a rat’s cognitive life because, at a pretty complex level of structure and function, they have essentially the same machinery in their head that we do.  It’s a bit less convincing to use the same anthropomorphic logic to justify associating what looks like play behavior in an octopus with the “intelligence” that we suspect goes along with play behavior in vertebrates.  This is because the existence of analogous neural substrates and their accompanying cognitive functions (emotions, hedonic value, etc.) is not clear.  It strikes me as somewhat mistaken that we would use psychological constructs that were created to describe human behavior such as “play” and “problem-solving” to describe cephalopod behavior, though we do it even when they appear to be a poor fit to the behavior in question.

         As Jennifer Mather points out in her quote in the Boston Globe article: “We’re smart and the octopus is smart, but octopus intelligence just can’t be related to our intelligence.”  This I have to agree with.  Just because we can call a behavior something that sounds familiar (in this case, “play”) doesn’t mean that we’ve explained it, even though it might appear this way.  I think that octopuses are fascinating and astounding creatures that exhibit very interesting behaviors; I’m just not quite convinced that they play.

Thanks for reading!

Kuba, M., Byrne, R., Meisel, D., & Mather, J. (2006). When do octopuses play? Effects of repeated testing, object type, age, and food deprivation on object play in Octopus vulgaris. Journal of Comparative Psychology, 120 (3), 184-190 DOI: 10.1037/0735-7036.120.3.184

M Kuba, D V Meisel, R A Byrne, U Griebel, & J A Mather (2003). Looking at Play in Octopus Vulgaris Coleoid cephalopods through time, 163-169